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General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and 
Documents of Title 
By David Frisch* and John D. Wladis** 
This article reviews recent case law and related developments under Articles 
1, 2, 6 and 7 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. or Code). 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
The past year has seen continued litigation under section 2-201. More 
significantly, however, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws Article 2 Drafting Committee has tentatively decided to repeal the 
statute of frauds. 1 Consequently, the cases mentioned herein may, in the .not too 
distant future, become irrelevant. 
Milltex Industries Corp. v. jacquard Lace Co.,2 epitomizes the type of case 
that calls for repeal of the statute. The parties admittedly entered into an oral 
contract for the purchase and sale of "griege goods" (an unfinished textile). 
Pursuant to this agreement, the seller shipped and the buyer accepted 23,000 
pounds of the goods. When the buyer refused to pay, the seller sued. Thereupon 
the buyer filed a counterclaim contending that, pursuant to the oral agreement, 
the seller had agreed to ship 40,000 pounds of the goods. The trial court granted 
*Mr. Frisch is a member of the Florida and Rhode Island bars and a professor of law at the 
Widener University School of Law . 
.. Mr. Wladis is a member of the New York bar and an associate professor of law at the Widener 
University School of Law. 
The following people contributed to the preparation of this article: Donald W. Garland, Gregory 
Gelfand, Bryan Hull, Gary Monserud, Robert E. Nies, and William R. Waddell. 
1. It may not be enough simply to repeal § 2-201. It was also proposed that the revised Article 2 
should specifically exempt contracts within its scope from the coverage of all non-Code statutes of 
frauds. As things now stand, the applicability of non-Code statutes of frauds to Article 2 cases is 
uncertain. In one case decided this survey period, AP Propane, Inc. v. Superbeck, 555 N.Y.S.2d 211, 
12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 35 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), the general statute of frauds was 
held to be inapplicable to requirements contracts covered by the U.C.C. Id. at 212-13, 12 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 36-37. In another case, Monetti, S.P.A. v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 931 
F.2d 1178, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 706 (7th Cir. 1991 ), the Seventh Circuit suggested 
that § 2-201 may not apply at all to an exclusive distributorship agreement despite the fact that 
because its predominant purpose was the sale of goods, it would be classified for other purposes as 
an Article 2 contract. Id. at 1184, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 714-15. 
2. 557 So. 2d 1222, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 44 (Ala. 1990). 
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summary judgment for the seller on both its claim and the buyer's counterclaim. 
On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.3 
The supreme court began by correctly recognizing that an oral contract can 
be enforced to the extent goods have been received and accepted by the buyer.4 
The buyer, however, argued that summary judgment was inappropriate because 
there was a question of fact concerning the price, contending that the agreed-
upon price per pound was $4.15, not $4.50 per pound as was claimed by the 
seller. Remarkably, the court found this contention to be "untenable,"5 stating 
that the buyer had never objected to the seller's written confirmation which 
reflected the higher price.6 But this interpretation misses the point of the statute 
and confuses it with the parol evidence rule. There is a difference between 
compliance with the statute of frauds and the existence of a signed written 
agreement sufficient to preclude litigation over its terms. If the failure to 
respond to a confirmatory memorandum would not bar a trial on the defense of 
no contract, certainly the door should not be closed to disputing its terms.7 
Finally, with respect to the buyer's counterclaim, the court ruled that sum-
mary judgment was proper because proof of the alleged contract was prohibited 
by section 2-201(1).8 The court ignored the statutory exception for judicial 
admissions.9 Because the existence of a contract was never in dispute, this seems 
to be an especially compelling case for giving the buyer the opportunity, through 
discovery or otherwise, to extract an admission of the greater quantity. 10 The 
3. Id. at 1224, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 46. 
4. Id. at 1223, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 46; see U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(c) (1991). 
This exception to the statute's writing requirement was also involved in Joseph Heiting & Sons v. 
Jacks Bean Co., 463 N.W.2d 817, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 336 (Neb. 1990), where 
the Nebraska Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether 
the buyer had "accepted" the seller's beans by commingling them with other beans. Id. at 822-23, 
13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 341-42. Additionally, the court decided that trade usage 
could not be a further source of exceptions to the statute. Id. at 822, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) at 341. 
5. Milltex Industries, 557 So. 2d at 1223-24, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 46. 
6. Id. at 1224, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 46. The court mistakenly believed that 
this holding was consistent with§ 2-201(2). That subsection provides: 
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract and 
sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to know its 
contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection ( 1) against such party unless written notice 
of objection to its contents is given within 10 days after it is received. 
U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (1991). 
7. A number of cases have held correctly that a failure to respond to a confirmatory memoran-
dum does not bar a trial on the question of whether there actually was a contract. See, e.g., 
Spinnerin Yarn Co. v. Apparel Retail Corp., 614 F. Supp. 1174, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
65 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
8. Milltex Industries, 557 So. 2d at 1224, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 46. 
9. See U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b) (1991). 
10. There has never been a consensus on how much latitude the party asserting a contract 
should have to elicit an admission from the party who is asserting the statute of frauds as a defense. 
The diverse views on this subject are discussed in Triangle Mktg., Inc. v. Action Indus., Inc., 630 F. 
Supp. 1578, 1581-84, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 36, 40-46 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
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purpose of the statute seemingly has been satisfied once the contract is admitted, 
and all of its terms should be fair game for proof by either party. 11 
The potential for the statute to foster rather than to prevent fraud often can 
be ameliorated by a genuinely creative court. For example, consider Judge 
Posner's opinion in Monetti, S.P.A. v. Anchor Hocking Corp. 12 The plaintiffs, 
an Italian firm and its subsidiary that made products for the food service 
industry, allegedly agreed to grant the defendant the exclusive right to distribute 
their products in the United States. In return, the defendant allegedly guaran-
teed that it would make specified minimum purchases, adding up to $27 million 
during the term of the agreement. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs turned over 
to the defendant all of the subsidiary's inventory, records, and other physical 
assets, together with the subsidiary's trade secrets and know-how. Eventually, 
the parties' relationship deteriorated and the plaintiffs sued for breach of 
contract. The district judge dismissed the suit as barred by the statute of frauds. 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed. 13 While the result of the case 
actually rested on the conclusion that a post-contract memorandum written by 
the defendant's marketing director was sufficient under section 2-201 (1 ), the 
opinion touches on numerous statute of frauds issues.14 Two are of particular 
interest. The first pertains to a memorandum that preceded the actual formation 
of the contract. Although section 2-201 ( 1 ), interpreted literally, seems to pre-
clude consideration of precontractual writings, the court decided that this was 
not what the drafters intended. 15 Where, as here, the memorandum prepared by 
the defendant indicated acceptance of most of the provisions requested by the 
plaintiffs, the court felt that there was no reason why it could not be used to 
satisfy the statute. 16 The second interesting aspect of the opinion is the court's 
willingness to recognize a "partial performance" exception to the statute. 17 
Judge Posner was careful, however, to limit its scope to performance other than 
the delivery of the goods.18 Here, the evidentiary weight of the plaintiffs' 
11. Interestingly, there is authority this year that a writing under subsection (I) need not specify 
a quantity. See Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 677-78, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) 669, 677-80 (3rd Cir. 1991). If that is true, there is no reason why a party should not 
be permitted to prove a quantity when an oral contract is otherwise admitted. 
12. 931F.2d1178, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 706 (7th Cir. 1991). 
13. Id. at 1186, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 718. 
14. Id. at 1181-85, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 710-16. In an opinion consisting 
largely of dicta, the following are just a few of the issues discussed: (I) whether oral evidence may be 
admitted to show that an ambiguous writing satisfied the statute (yes), (2) whether the statute is 
substantive for purposes of the Erie doctrine (yes), (3) whether a letterhead satisfies the signature 
requirement (yes), and (4) whether promissory estoppel can be used to avoid the statute (maybe). 
15. Id. at 1182, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 712. 
16. Id. The court distinguished the case before it from two others where the precontractual 
writing would not be sufficient. In the first, the writing is merely one party's offer. In the second, the 
writing consists of no more than notes made in preparation for a negotiating session. 
17. Id. at 1183, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 712. 
18. Id. at 1184, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 715. The court's explanation for this 
limitation makes sense. "In such a case partial performance just is not indicative of the existence of 
an oral contract for any quantity greater than that already delivered .. . "Id. 
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performance was inescapable-if there had been no agreement why was the 
subsidiary's property transferred to the defendant? This evidence was so per-
suasive that most courts would stretch to find a way to give the plaintiffs their 
day in court. 
PAROL EVIDENCE 
The New York Court of Appeals, in lntershoe, Inc. v. Bankers Trust 
Company, 19 issued an opinion that was as significant for what it did not say, as 
for what it did say. Over many years, a shoe importer (lntershoe) had entered 
into hundreds of transactions with Banker's Trust Co. (Bankers) for the 
exchange of Italian lira, for U.S. dollars. On one occasion Intershoe's treasurer 
negotiated a transaction by telephone. Bankers sent Intershoe a confirmation 
slip describing the transaction as a sale of lira by lntershoe to Bankers. 
Intershoe's treasurer signed the slip and returned it to Bankers. Later, after 
Bankers asked for delivery of the lira, Intershoe replied that it had agreed to 
buy, not sell, the lira. lntershoe sued Bankers for failure to deliver the lira, 
claiming that the confirmation slip was mistaken. Bankers counterclaimed. The 
trial court denied Bankers' motion for summary judgment on the main claim 
and its counterclaim. On appeal, a divided court affirmed.20 The appellate court 
concluded that denial of summary judgment was proper for two reasons: First, 
lntershoe's claim of mistake raised a factual issue as to whether the confirma-
tion slip constituted a "final expression" of the parties' agreement under U.C.C. 
Section 2-202. Second, where one party claims that by mutual mistake a writing 
does not reflect the actual agreement, oral evidence of the parties' actual 
agreement is admissible. 
The New York Court of Appeals unanimously reversed and directed that 
summary judgment for Bankers be granted.21 The court reasoned that the 
confirmation slip was a final expression of the parties' agreement so that 
Intershoe's proffered evidence, which contradicted the confirmation slip, was 
inadmissible under U.C.C. Section 2-202.22 
The court of appeals did not address mutual mistake, the Appellate Divi-
sion's second reason for admitting Intershoe's evidence. This omission is puz-
zling, because the mutual mistake exception to the parol evidence rule repeat-
edly has been recognized by the New York Court of Appeals in other cases.23 
It is possible that the court of appeals interpreted U.C.C. Section 2-202 to bar 
the introduction of any parol evidence contradicting a writing that is a final 
expression of the parties' agreement. If so, this interpretation of section 2-202 
almost certainly is incorrect. Under pre-Code cases, it was clear that the parol 
1'). 571 N.E.2d 641, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1 (N.Y. 1991). 
20. lntershoe, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 554 N.Y.S. 2d 514 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). 
21. lntershoe, 571 N.E.2d at 642-43, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 2. 
22. Id. at 644, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 4-5. 
23. See, e.g., Chimart Assoc. v. Paul, 489 N.E.2d 231, 233-34 (N.Y. 1986); Marine Midland 
Bank-Southern v. Thurlow, 425 N.E.2d 805, 807 (N.Y. 1981 ). 
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evidence rule did not bar oral evidence of mutual mistake.24 This rule continues 
in non-sales parol evidence cases.25 Because section 2-202 does not create a 
specific exception for mutual mistake, it has been argued that the pre-Code 
mutual mistake exception has been abolished in sales cases. The counter 
argument is that this exception continues to be good law, either under section 1-
103, or under the "final expression" requirement of section 2-202.26 
Nothing in the drafting history of section 2-202 suggests that the drafters 
intended to abolish the mutual mistake exception. Given the wide recognition of 
this exception, one would have expected some indication in either text or 
comments if the drafters had intended to abolish it. What evidence there is 
indicates otherwise. In 1954, the New York State Law Revision Commission 
suggested that a sentence be added to section 2-202 saving the law of reforma-
tion. The Article 2 Subcommittee of the Editorial Board rejected the suggested 
addition as unnecessary, because nothing in the section dealt with reformation.27 
This is tantamount to a statement that nothing in the section deals with mutual 
mistake because mutual mistake is the chief ground for reformation.28 
The lntershoe court, no doubt, was concerned about the ease with which a 
commercial entity could sign a contract and then avoid summary judgment by 
alleging a mistake in expression. One solution to this problem is to treat all such 
allegations as equitable claims for reformation or rescission. Indeed, lntershoe 
was, in effect, seeking reformation of the confirmation slip. Treating the claim 
of mistake in expression as an equity matter will result in appropriate weight 
being given to a writing while not completely foreclosing a litigant's ability to 
show a mistake in expression. This is true for several reasons. First, the court 
decides the mistake issue. 29 Second, mistake in expression must be proved by 
"clear and convincing" evidence.3° Finally, gross negligence, as where one signs 
a written contract perfectly clear in its terms without reading it, can preclude a 
reformation claim.31 
24. See, e.g., Restatement of Contracts§ 238(b), (c) (1932); Charles T. McCormick, Handbook 
of the Law of Evidence 450, n.7 (1954). 
25. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) Contracts§ 214(d) (1981); Id.§ 155, cmt. a; see also supra 
note 23 (for examples of New York Court of Appeals cases cited). 
26. See James White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code§ 2-11 (3d student ed. 
1988); William Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series§ 2-202:02 at 45 (1984). 
27. Comment on Criticisms of Article 2 Uniform Commercial Code at 16 (Oct. 31, 1955) in the 
Robert Braucher Papers, at the Harvard Law School Library, File 26-2 ("The new sentence is 
unnecessary; nothing in the section deals with reformation."). 
28. E.g. Henry L. McClintock, Handbook of the Principles of Equity 256-83 (2d ed. 1948). 
29. Equitable defenses, even if asserted in legal actions, generally are decided by the court. See, 
e.g., Fleming James and Geoffrey Hazard, Civil Procedure§ 8.8 (3d ed. 1985). This is also the rule 
in New York: See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 4101(McKinney1963 and Supp. 1991). 
30. See generally George E. Palmer, Reformation and the Paro/ Evidence Rule, 65 Mich. L. 
Rev. 833 (1967). For New York cases, see 16 N.Y. Jur. 2d, Cancellation and Reformation of 
Instruments§ 60 (1982 & Supp. 1991). 
31. Schneider v. Swartele, 267 N.Y.S. 714, aff'd, 8 N.E.2d 336 (1933); see generally 16 N.Y. 
Jur. 2d, Cancellation and Reformation of Instruments§ 50 (1982 & Supp. 1991). 
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In Gordon v. Northwest Auto Auction, lnc.,32 the North Carolina Supreme 
Court ruled that evidence of trade usage was inadmissible to explain clear and 
unambiguous language in a contract. The rule applied in this case is in direct 
conflict with the drafters' intent as expressed in Comment l(c) to section 2-
202.33 The court should have relied on section 1-205.34 It could have kept the 
testimony out, either on the theory that it did not constitute trade usage,35 or on 
the theory that express terms control trade usage when one is not reasonably 
consistent with the other.36 
BATTLE OF THE FORMS 
Suppose a buyer is aware of a boilerplate term and objects to it. The seller 
then refuses to change the term, and the buyer continues to order goods from the 
seller. Is the buyer stuck with the term? He is, ruled the U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Advance Concrete Forms, Inc. v. McCann 
Construction Specialties Co. 37 There, the buyer was a distributor of the seller's 
products and ordered goods on numerous occasions. Each of the seller's invoices 
contained an 18% per annum finance charge clause. The buyer was aware of 
this clause and claimed it had objected to it. Nevertheless, the buyer continued to 
order goods from the seller. Eventually the business relationship soured, and the 
seller sued to recover the unpaid balance together with the 18% finance charge. 
Both the district court and the Seventh Circuit held the buyer liable for the 
finance charge. The district court characterized the buyer's actions in objecting 
to the clause but continuing to order goods as a "grumbling acceptance." The 
Seventh Circuit, citing Comment 5 to U.C.C. Section 2-207, found the clause 
not to be a material alteration.38 It also found that the buyer had waived its 
objection to the term by continuing to purchase goods on credit with knowledge 
of the clause. 39 
Not all courts agree with this approach. For example, in the 1986 case of 
Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp.,40 the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that a buyer who had unsuccessfully objected to a limitation of 
32. 400 S.E.2d 37, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 994 (N.C. 1991) (per curiam), rev'g 
387 S.E.2d 227, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 10 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990). 
33. Section 2-202, Comment 1 provides, in pertinent part: "This section definitely rejects: ... (c) 
The requirement that a condition precedent to the admissibility of the type of evidence specified in 
paragraph (a) [e.g. usage of trade] is an original determination by the court that the language used 
is ambiguous." U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 1 (1991). 
34. U.C.C. § 1-205 specifically addresses course of dealing and trade usage. 
35. u.c.c. § 1-205(2) (1991). 
36. u.c.c. § 1-205(4) (1991). 
37. 916 F.2d 412, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1047 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying 
Wisconsin law). 
38. Advance Concrete Forms, Inc., 916 F.2d at 416, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 
1053. 
39. Id. 
40. 794 F.2d 1440, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1073 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying Oregon 
law). 
U.C.C. Survey: General Provisions 1523 
liability clause in the seller's form, but nevertheless continued to order goods 
from that seller, was not bound by that clause. This interpretation almost 
certainly was not intended by the drafters of section 2-207. That section was 
drafted in part to regulate the "battle of the forms"-the circumstance when 
buyer and seller exchange forms which match each other on dickered terms, 
such as quantity and price, but conflict on the pre-printed, boilerplate terms.41 
Nevertheless, both parties proceed to perform without discussing the differences 
between the forms. Because neither side has called its terms to the other's 
attention, neither side has a superior claim to having its terms included in the 
contract. The fairest result is to form the contract on the terms jointly agreed to, 
plus other terms supplied from neutral sources, such as trade usage, or Article 2. 
This is what section 2-207(3) does. 
When, however, the parties have discussed a term and failed to agree, a buyer 
who is aware that the seller is insisting on a particular term, and who then 
orders goods from that seller, should be bound by that term. The drafting 
history of Article 2 does not support the view that the drafters intended section 
2-207(3) to apply beyond the battle of the forms situation described in the 
previous paragraph. The history of section 2-207(3) argues against a rule as 
radical as that of Diamond Fruit.42 Furthermore, the drafting history of Article 
2 indicates that terms called to the other side's attention cannot be ignored. 
Thus, for example, under U.C.C. Section 2-207(1), a different dickered term 
prevents a response from operating as a definite expression of acceptance, but 
not a different boilerplate term.43 And under U.C.C. Section 2-206(1 )(b) a 
dickered term ordering certain goods cannot be ignored by shipping other 
41. See Llewellyn's and other's descriptions in Minutes, Pennsylvania Legislative Sub-commit-
tee Meeting at 64-66 (June 21, 1952), reprinted in The Karl N. Llewellyn Papers, Section]: The 
Uniform Commercial Code, File J-(XIV)(l)U) (Wm. S. Hein & Co., Inc., Microfilm, 1987) 
[hereinafter The Llewellyn Papers]; A.L.I., Transcript of Proceedings at the Annual Meeting of the 
A.L.I. in Joint Session with the N.C.C.U.S.L. 27-28 (May 1951) in The Llewellyn Papers, supra, 
File J-(XIII)(l)(d). 
42. U.C.C. Supplement No. 1 to the 1952 Official Draft of Text and Comments of the Uniform 
Commercial Code,§ 2-207(5) [hereinafter Supp. No. 1], reprinted in 17 A.L.I. & N.C.C.U.S.L., 
Uniform Commercial Code Drafts 324-25 (1984) [hereinafter U.C.C. Drafts]. The Supp. No. 1 
version of§ 2-207 resulted from a meeting with the Commercial Code Committee of the Pennsylva-
nia State Chamber of Commerce in December 1954. That meeting was held to answer objections 
raised to Article 2 raised by that organization. The present text of § 2-207 was proposed by the 
Pennsylvania State Chamber of Commerce Commercial Code Committee as an alternative to the 
Supp. No. 1 draft. The Pennsylvania Committee was composed primarily of corporate attorneys. It 
is unlikely that a committee so composed would have favored the radical restructuring of offer and 
acceptance rules adopted in Diamond Fruit. 
43. Cf U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1. Comment 1 gives two examples: 1) non-form letter or wire that 
adds minor suggestions or proposals; (2) exchange of forms often with terms different from each 
other. Note the absence of reference to different terms in the example describing non-form 
acceptance. Id. Compare Supp. No. 1, supra note 42, § 2-207( 1) (non-form offer: definite and 
seasonable expression of acceptance with additional terms operates as an acceptance) with id. 
§ 2-207( 4) (offer with form clauses; definite and seasonable expression of acceptance with additional 
or different terms operates as an acceptance). 
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goods.44 Lastly, the Diamond Fruit view is inconsistent with the approach 
endorsed in other sections of Article 2, that the way to m~ke an unusual term 
enforceable, is to call it to the other side's attention.45 I 
The fact that section 2-207(3) was intended to abolish the so-called "last 
shot" rule does not support the Diamond Fruit result. The last shot rule was 
essentially an application of common law contract doctrine that retention of 
benefits accompanying an offer constitutes acceptance of the terms of that 
offer.46 This rule is fair when the offeree is aware of the offer's terms. It begins 
to be unfair when the offeree is not reasonably aware of the terms. This is the 
case when the crucial terms are in boilerplate language, because the boilerplate 
language usually is not read. Thus, it is unfair to apply the rule of acceptance 
by retention of offered benefits to the battle of the forms. Section 2-207(3) 
abrogates that rule to eliminate this unfairness. 
When the buyer is aware of the term and orders the goods, however, it is not 
unfair to hold him to that term. He is aware of the term and that the goods are 
offered subject to that term; therefore he should be bound by the term. Indeed, 
the Diamond Fruit rule can produce patently unjust results. Suppose the buyer 
is displeased with the seller's asking price or credit terms. Under Diamond 
Fruit, the buyer can order the goods and, barring its specific and unequivocal 
asset, not be bound to the seller's price or credit terms. This outcome makes no 
sense, nor is there any support for it in the drafting history of Article 2.47 Other 
cases are not in agreement with the Diamond Fruit rule.48 Commentators have 
criticized it.49 The Diamond Fruit rule should be abandoned. 
44. Unless the seller notifies the buyer that it is shipping nonconforming goods as an accommo-
dation to the buyer, the seller will be deemed to have both accepted the offer and breached it by 
shipping goods that do not conform to the offer. See U.C.C. § 2-206 cmt. 4. 
45. See U.C.C. §§ 2-205, 2-209(2), 2-316(2), (3). See also U.C.C. § 2-504 cmt. 5 ("To have this 
vital and irreparable effect upon the seller's duties, such a term should be part of the 'dickered' 
terms written in any 'form', or should otherwise be called•seasonably and sharply to the seller's 
attention."); General Comment on Part II: Formation and Construction 13-14, 21-23 (1948) in The 
Llewellyn Papers, supra note 41, File J-(X)(2)(e) (same). 
46. 1 Arthur Corbin, Contracts§ 75, text at n.39 (1962). 
47. See supra note 42. 
48. See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. International Tel. & Telegraph Corp., 550 F. Supp. 
108, 112, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1124, 1127-28 (D. Minn. 1982) (applying Minn. law); 
McKenzie v. Alla-Ohio Coals, Inc., 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 852, 855 (D.D.C. 1979); 
Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 694 P.2d 267, 
274-75, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 75, 83-85, (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983), approved 694 P.2d 
198, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 418 (Ariz. 1984). Cf Union Carbide Corp. v. Oscar 
Mayer Foods Corp., 947 F.2d 1333, 1336, 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 46, 50-51 (7th Cir. 
1991); see also Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 596 F.2d 924, 926-27, 26 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 638, 640-43 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying Idaho law) (buyer who had 
"discussed" boilerplate remedy limitation provisions with the seller was held to be bound by those 
provisions). 
49. See, e.g., John E. Murray, The Chaos of the Battle of the Forms: Solutions, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 
1307, 1330-43 (1986); David Frisch et al., Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: General 
Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers and Documents of Title, 42 Bus. Law. 1213, 1228-34 (1987). 
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Does the expressly conditional proviso of section 2-207( 1) apply to a written 
confirmation of a prior informal agreement? Air Master Sales Co. v. North-
bridge Park Co-op, Inc., so decided by the U.S. District Court for the District of 
New Jersey, presents a muddled analysis of this issue. Northbridge Park Co-op 
(Co-op) decided to replace some 2400 windows in its apartment building. After 
discussions with Tri-State, a window installer (Installer) and Air Master, a 
window manufacturer (Manufacturer), Co-op signed a contract with Installer 
for it to provide and install the windows. Installer then contracted with 
Manufacturer to custom-make the windows, which the Manufacturer did. 
Shortly after Installer commenced installation, Co-op terminated its agreement 
with Installer because it was not satisfied with Installer's work. Co-op then 
negotiated directly with Manufacturer for the windows, resulting in a letter 
from Co-op to manufacturer confirming the negotiations. The letter recited 
price and a few other details and asked Manufacturer to sign and return a copy 
of the letter to indicate Manufacturer's "affirmance" of these terms. Manufac-
turer signed the letter after adding the clause "This confirmation will be valid 
only when [Manufacturer] receives a Purchase Order from the [Co-op] for the 
windows."s1 Manufacturer then returned this letter together with a cover letter 
requesting that arrangements be made as soon as possible for delivery of the 
windows to the job site. Later Co-op decided not to take the windows and did 
not issue a purchase order. Manufacturer sued Co-op on various theories, 
including breach of a contract for the windows, which Manufacturer claimed 
had resulted from its negotiations with Co-op. The court granted summary 
judgment for Co-op.s2 On the breach of contract claim the court concluded that 
no contract had been formed under section 2-207. s3 It reasoned that the clause 
added by Manufacturer rendered its acceptance "expressly conditional" under 
section 2-207(1 ).s4 Since that acceptance never became effective, no contract was 
formed.ss 0 
One of the points in dispute was whether the negotiations preceding Co-op's 
letter had resulted in an agreement. s6 What the court did not address was 
whether the "expressly conditional" proviso of section 2-207( 1) had any appli-
cation to a written confirmation of a prior informal agreement. It is clear from 
the text and comments to,s7 as well as the drafting historyss of section 2-207(1) 
50. 748 F. Supp. 1110, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 726 (D.N.J. 1990) (applying New 
Jersey law). 
51. Id. at 1113, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 728. Air Master claimed that it had 
added the clause only because its internal procedures required receipt of a purchase order to input 
the order into its bookkeeping system. Id. at 1114. 
52. Air Master Sales, 748 F. Supp. at 1111, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 726. 
53. Id. at 1116-17, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 729-31. 
54. Id., 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 730. 
55. Id., 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 731. 
56. Id. at 1116; 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 729. 
57. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2 provides in pertinent part: "[T)herefore any additional matter 
contained in the confirmation or in the acceptance falls within subsection (2) and must be regarded 
as a proposal for an added term unless the acceptance is made conditional on the acceptance of the 
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that the expressly conditional proviso does not apply to a written confirmation. 
Caselaw agrees.59 If an agreement had been reached in Air Master before the 
exchange of letters, then Manufacturer's confirmation, even if it were expressly 
conditional, would not upset that agreement. The question of whether the 
parties reached an agreement is a material question of fact which should have 
prevented summary judgment. 
WARRANTY OF TITLE 
Does an auctioneer of goods impliedly warrant title under U.C.C. Section 2-
312? In Jones v. Ballard,60 the Mississippi Supreme Court held that if the 
auctioneer does not disclose the principal for whom it is selling, the auctioneer is 
deemed to be the seller and thus warrants title. If the auctioneer, however, does 
disclose its principal when it sells, the principal, not the auctioneer, is the seller 
and warrants title under section 2-312. 61 
The drafting history makes clear that auctioneers are not automatically 
protected by subsection 2-312(2) on the theory that the circumstances give the 
buyer reason to know that the auctioneer is not claiming title in itself.62 
additional or different terms." (emphasis added). Note that this excerpt refers to both "the 
confirmation" and "the acceptance" when describing the type of response, but refers only to "the 
acceptance" when discussing the expressly conditional proviso. The grammatical structure of 
§ 2-207(1) is such that the term "the acceptance" in the proviso could refer either to "expression of 
acceptance" (a factual description which is distinct from a "confirmation") or to "operates as an 
acceptance" (a legal conclusion which includes both "expression of acceptance" and "confirma-
tion.") Comment 2 indicates that the term "the acceptance" in the expressly conditional proviso was 
intended to refer to "expressidn of acceptance." 
58. Cf Comment on§ 29 [2-10] additional Terms in Acceptance of confirmation, at 1 (1948), 
reprinted in The Llewellyn Papers, supra note 41, ("If the deal has in fact been closed, this Act 
recognizes it as a contract and any additional matter contained either in the acceptance which closed 
the deal or in a later confirmation falls within paragraph (a) [now 2-207( 1 )] and must be regarded 
as a proposal for an added term or modification which in no way upsets the original deal.") 
(emphasis added); Supp. No. 1, supra note 42, § 2-207(1), (2) & (3) (Jan. 1955), reprinted in 17 
U.C.C. Drafts 324 (Expressly conditional proviso is contained in subsections (2) and (3) dealing 
with expressions of acceptance, but not in subsection (1) dealing with confirmations). 
59. For cases, see James White and Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code,§§ 1-3, at 
45 n.60 (3d student ed. 1988). 
60. 573 So. 2d 783, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 731, (Miss. 1990). 
61. See 80 A.L.R. 2d 1237 (1961) (cases are collected in Annotation Liability of Auctioneer or 
Clerk To Buyer as to the Condition, or Quantity of Property Sold). 
62. Uniform Sales Act § 13( 4) explicitly protected auctioneers from the implied warranty of 
title. Accord Second Draft of A Revised Uniform Sales Act § 13(2) (Dec. 1941 ), reprinted in 1 
U.C.C. Drafts, supra note 42 at 386-87. In the Revised Uniform Sales Act, Third Draft § 36(2) 
( 1943) in the A.L.I. Archives, Drawer 202, the specific references to auctioneers and others has been 
replaced with general language very similar to what is now U.C.C. § 2-316(2). See N.C.C.U.S.L., 
Consideration in Committee of the Whole of the Revised Uniform Sales Act at 95 (Aug. 17-21, 
1943) in the Llewellyn Papers, supra note 41, File J-(V)(2)(h). Cf U.C.C. § 2-316, cmt. 5 which 
does not list auctioneers among those who are covered by§ 2-316(2). 
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IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANT ABILITY 
In Osborn v. Custom Truck Sales & Service,63 the Alabama Supreme Court 
held that there is no implied warranty of merchantability in the sale of used 
motor vehicles by a merchant seller. The recognition of an implied warranty of 
merchantability in the sale of used goods can produce difficult questions of fact. 
Some defects are to be anticipated in used goods, though the extent of such 
defects may well be unknown at the time of sale. Thus, some jurisdictions have 
held that there is no implied warranty of merchantability in the sale of used 
goods.64 The drafters of Article 2 were cognizant of these concerns;65 however, 
instead of ruling out such a warranty, they opted to allow the implied 
merchantability warranty for used goods in appropriate circumstances.66 
Trademark owners sometimes license the trademark for use by manufactur-
ers. Franchisors often license franchisees to manufacture and sell products 
bearing the franchisor's name. The circumstances in which the trademark 
owner or franchisor can be liable for breach of warranty for goods manufac-
tured under such a trademark licensing or franchise agreement were discussed 
by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Burkert v. Petrol Plus of Naugatuck, 
lnc.67 Courts usually decline to find liability on the basis of Article 2 warranties, 
since the trademark licensor or franchisor is not a "seller."68 Several courts, 
however, have found a franchisor or trademark licensor liable on other theories. 
Noting that Article 2 was not intended to disturb case-law development of 
warranty law,69 these courts find liability on common law theory70 or on strict 
tort liability theory.71 In Burkert, the trademark licensor was held not liable 
because it had no significant control over the manufacture or marketing of the 
63. 562 So.2d 243, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 664 (Ala. 1990). 
64. See Editors' Note to Trax, Inc. v. Tidmore, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 92-93 (Ala. 
1976). 
65. Second Draft of a Revised Uniform Sales Act, Comment on Section 15, at 114 (Dec. 1941), 
reprinted in 1 U.C.C. Drafts, supra note 42, at 394 ("(T]he cases have shown a very healthy 
caution in finding any kind of reliance or of merchantability-warranty in second-hand sales. The 
subsection would not affect these, in any ordinary circumstances"). 
66. U.C.C. § 2-314, cmt. 3 ("A contract for the sale of second-hand goods, however, involves 
only such obligation as is appropriate to such goods for that is their description.") A longer, prior 
draft of this comment was clearer on the intent to impose an implied warranty of merchantability in 
the sale of used goods. See Comment on Section 38 (3-13]. Implied Warranty of Merchantability at 
4 (1948), reprinted in The Llewellyn Papers, supra note 41, File J-(X)(2)(e). 
67. 579 A.2d 26, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 85 (Conn. 1990). 
68. See, e.g., id. at 35, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 91. 
69. See U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 2. 
70. See, e.g., Kosters v. Seven-Up Co., 595 F.2d 347, 351-53 (6th Cir. 1979) (applying 
Michigan law) (consumer injured by exploding bottle; suit against franchisor); Harris v. Aluminum 
Co. of Am., 550 F. Supp. 1024, 1027-28, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 397, 400-02 (W.D. 
Va. 1982) (applying Virginia law) (consumer injured by defective bottle cap; suit against fran-
chisor). 
71. See cases cited in Kosters, 595 F.2d at 352, n.11. 
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product, and did not receive royalties or other financial benefits from the 
licensing program.72 
The form of a transaction often can have unintended consequences. In 
Merritt Logan, Inc. v. Fleming Companies, Inc. (In re Merritt Logan, lnc.),73 a 
payment guarantee was structured as a sale of goods to the guarantor who 
immediately resold to the debtor. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held the 
guarantor liable as a seller for breach of warranty to the debtor when the goods 
malfunctioned.74 The guarantor could have avoided warranty liability either by 
disclaiming warranties under U.C.C. Section 2-316 or by structuring the deal as 
a direct sale from the manufacturer to the debtor, with the guarantor guarantee-
ing the debtor's payment. 
DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES 
In Cate v. Dover Corp. 75 the Texas Supreme Court held that an inconspicu-
ous written disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability was effective 
if the buyer had actual knowledge of the disclaimer.76 The buyer in that case 
was not a consumer. The court reasoned that, because the purpose of the 
conspicuousness requirement contained in section 2-316(2) is to protect the 
buyer from surprise and an unknowing waiver of its rights, the buyer's actual 
knowledge satisfied that purpose and made the disclaimer effective.77 The court 
also ruled the seller had the burden of proving that the buyer had knowledge of 
the disclaimer.78 
This result is consistent with both the drafting history79 and Official Com-
ments to section 2-316. 80 Nevertheless, a substantial body of case law has 
72. Burkert, 579 A.2d at 35, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 91. 
73. 901 F.2d 349, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 421 (3d Cir. 1990). 
74. Id. at 358-59, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 432-33. 
75. 790 S.W.2d 559, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 47 (Tex. 1990). 
76. Id. at 562, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 54. 
77. Id. at 561, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 53. For a discussion of this issue, see 
Barkley Clark & Christopher Smith, The Law of Product Warranties, ii 8.03[2] at 8-16 to -17 
(1984). 
78. Cate, 790 S.W.2d at 562, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 53. 
79. The twin requirements of conspicuousness and mention of merchantability contained in 
§ 2-316(2) were added in 1955 by Supp. No. 1, supra note 42, reprinted in 17 U.C.C. Drafts 327. 
Before that addition, the only requirement for an effective disclaimer of implied warranties was that 
the disclaimer be in "specific language" coupled with the statement that if such language created 
"an ambiguity in the contract as a whole it shall be resolved against the seller." See Uniform 
Commercial Code: Official Draft, Text and Comments Edition§ 2-316(2) (1952), reprinted in 14 
U.C:.C. Drafts supra note 42, 142-43. The Pennsylvania State Chamber of Commerce's Article 2 
subcommittee objected to the "specific language" requirement. It believed that this requirement 
"might require an untold number of paragraphs." It suggested substituting a "general language" 
requirement. See Letter of Joseph J. Kelley, Jr. to William A. Schnader dated Nov. 5, 1954 at 2 
and Enclosure 4 at I, in the A.L.I. Archives, Box 66, File: Comments on Code from Various 
Sources. As a result of a meeting with the Pennsylvania State Chamber of Commerce Commercial 
Code Committee, § 2-316(2) was redrafted as it appears in Supp. No. 1, supra. 
BO. U.C.C. § 2-316 cmt. I, 6. 
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developed, primarily where the buyer is a consumer, that treats the dual 
requirements of conspicuousness and mention of merchantability as formal 
requirements. Under this view, failure to satisfy those requirements invalidates 
any disclaimer, regardless of whether the buyer knew of and understood the 
disclaimer.81 The Permanent Editorial Board's Article 2 Study Group initially 
sided with the view that knowledge of an inconspicuous disclaimer makes the 
disclaimer effective.82 The Study Group then reversed its recommendation and 
adopted the "formal" view.83 The view that the Article 2 Drafting Committee 
will adopt is not yet known. 
TITLE, CREDITORS, AND GOOD FAITH PURCHASERS 
More cases involving the applicability of section 2-326 seem to arise from its 
coverage of true consignments than from any other cause.84 In In re Zwager-
man,85 the debtors owned and operated a farm at which they engaged in a 
practice known as "custom feeding." One of their customers, the Red River 
Company, would furnish cattle for fattening. When the cattle weighed approxi-
mately 1100 pounds the debtors would sell them as Red River's agent at an 
agreed price. Upon sale, the proceeds were to be delivered to Red River and the 
debtors would be paid for the weight gained by the cattle after delivery. On 
these facts, the bankruptcy court concluded that because Red River's cattle were 
not delivered to the debtors "for sale" as required by section 2-326, they neither 
became part of the bankruptcy estate nor subject to the claim of the debtors' 
secured creditor.86 On appeal, the district court affirmed, stating that the 
"primary purpose of the contract was for fattening because the available feed 
was better in Michigan. The sale of the cattle was incidental to the fattening 
contract."87 The court may have erred in making this statement. There is 
nothing in the statute to suggest a primary purpose analysis. While this 
interpretation of section 2-326(3) favors the true owner, it ignores the ostensible 
ownership concerns on which the section rests.88 
81. See Clark & Smith, supra note 77, 11 8.03[2]. 
82. See Preliminary Report, Article 2 Study Group: March 1, 1990, Rec. A2.3(13)(B), re-
printed in A.B.A. Task Force, "An Appraisal of the March 1, 1990, Preliminary Report of the 
U.C.C. Article 2 Study Group," 16 Del. J. Corp. L. 981, 1107 (1991). 
83. See P.E.B. Study Group, Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2 Executive Summary, 46 Bus. 
Law. 1869, 1879-80 (1991). 
84. Goods "held on sale or return" are subject to the claims of the buyer's creditors while in the 
buyer's possession. U.C.C. § 2-326(2). Even though the goods are delivered "'on consignment' or 
'on memorandum,"' id.§ 2-326(3), they will be deemed to be on "sale or return" if (1) the goods 
are delivered for sale; (2) the person maintains a place of business at which he deals in goods of that 
kind; and (3) the person deals under a name other than the name of the person making delivery. Id. 
85. 125 B.R. 486, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1062 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1991). 
86. In re Zwagerman, 125 B.R. at 489, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1064. 
87. Id. at 492, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1068-69. It should be noted that the 
court viewed the bankruptcy court's conclusion as one of fact which could only be reversed if clearly 
erroneous. Id. at 489, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1064. 
88. Whether this reading of the statute is faulty as a matter of policy will depend on the extent to 
which creditors, in fact, rely on their debtor's possession of specific assets. For an interesting 
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One other case involving section 2-326(3) decided this survey period seems 
inconsistent with Zwagerman. In In re Miller,89 the debtor did business as a 
seed company. In addition to buying, processing and selling seed on a wholesale 
distribution basis, the debtor would clean, bag, and store seed for farmers. 
Typically there was no agreement that the debtor would sell or purchase the 
farmers' seed. There was an understanding, however, that most of the seed 
would eventually be sold when the market price reached an acceptable level. 
The fact that the debtor was not given explicit authority to sell the seed did not 
faze the district court; it focused instead on the fact that a sale ultimately would 
occur.9° Consequently, section 2-326(3) was applicable and the seed was subject 
to the security interests of the debtor's secured creditors.91 It also might have 
been argued that because the farmers' seed had been commingled with seed 
belonging to the debtor, the security interests attached to the entire mass 
pursuant to section 9-315.92 
Two cases involving the applicability of section 2-403 also were litigated this 
year. In Sears Consumer Financial Corp. v. Thunderbird Products,93 the court 
held that the entrustment of collateral by a secured party was subject to the 
rights of buyers in the ordinary course under section 2-403(2).94 In Chicago 
Limousine Service, Inc. v. Hartigan Cadillac, lnc.,95 the Illinois Supreme Court 
had little difficulty in finding that a mutually rescinded sale of vehicles was not 
a "transaction of purchase" under section 2-403(1).96 Thus, the seller-whose 
checks representing a return of the purchase price had bounced-never acquired 
discussion of creditor reliance, see Charles W. Mooney, The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible 
Ownership" and Article 9 Filing: A Critique of Proposals to Extend Filing Requirements to Leases, 
39 Ala. L. Rev. 683 (1988). 
89. 119 B.R. 660, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1039 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1990). In 
Zwagerman, the court's characterization of the issue as one of fact allowed it to brush this case aside 
as one in which a different factual finding was made. 125 B.R. at 491, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) at 1067. 
90. Id. at 667, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1049. The court relied on the official 
comment to the section which explains that "subsection (3) was meant to resolve 'all reasonable 
doubts as to the nature of the transaction in favor of the general creditors of the buyer'." Id., 13 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1049 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-326 cmt. 2). In contrast, the 
Zwagerman court had this to say about that same comment: "a liberal interpretation does not 
include the rewriting of unambiguous phrases." 125 B.R. at 490, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) at 1066. 
91. In re Miller, 119 B.R. at 667, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1049. 
92. See generally David Frisch, U.C.C. Section 9-375: A Historical and Modern Perspective, 70 
Minn. L. Rev. 1, 14-21 (1985) (U.C.C. designed to minimize pre-Code risk of secured parties 
losing priority when goods become commingled). 
93. 802 P.2d 1035, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 675 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). 
94. There is a split of authority on this issue. See Note, Entrustment Under U.C.C. Section 
2-403 and Its Implications/or Article 9, 9 Campbell L. Rev. 407 (1987). 
95. 564 N.E.2d 797, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 306 (Ill. 1990). 
96. The court theorized that "(a] completed rescission in this case would not have been a 
'purchase', as that term is used in the U.C.C., because it would not have 'created' a property interest 
in [the seller]. Rather, it would have 'annulled' an interest in [the buyer]." Id., 13 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 314. 
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an interest in the vehicles sufficient to allow its lender's security interest to 
reattach.97 
TENDER, CURE, AND NOTICE 
A controversy over the constitutionality of the Code's "vouching in" provi-
sion98 has been waiting to boil over for years. When section 2-607(5)(a) was 
first drafted, there was little doubt that a wholesaler or manufacturer could be 
sued in the place where his component or product caused an injury.99 Beginning 
in 1980 with World Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 100 and most recently in 
Asahi Metal Industries, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 101 the U.S. Supreme Court has 
taken the inexplicable position that the involvement of a middleman breaks the 
minimum contacts chain for personal jurisdiction. Thus asserting jurisdiction-
the power to bind the wholesaler or manufacturer by the result of litigation 
brought by the end user against its seller-under the vouching in concept may 
be a denial of the due process rights of the wholesaler or manufacturer. 
The recent case of Step-Save Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology 102 raised 
this jurisdictional problem in an odd procedural posture, and the Third Circuit 
left the answer more ambiguous than it had been before the court addressed it. 
A commercial computer vendor (Step-Saver) from Pennsylvania sold computers 
in Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey. Step-Saver's suppliers were from 
Georgia and California. Serious problems with the computers arose, and Step-
Saver's customers sued it in some twelve cases in Pennsylvania, New York, and 
New Jersey. Step-Saver gave written notice to the suppliers as required by the 
Code and began third party actions against these same suppliers to obtain 
binding effect for the vouching in. The New York court dismissed the third 
party claim for lack of personal jurisdiction. 103 
97. Id., 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 313-15. If the court had determined that the 
rescission of the sales contract constituted a repurchase of the vehicles by the seller, the substance of 
the case would have been no different from that of In re Samuels & Co., 510 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 
1975), rev'd on rehearing en bane, 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976). 
98. U.C.C. § 2-607(5)(a) (1991). 
99. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 
355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 
761, 766 (Ill. 1961). 
100. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
101. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). The opinions in Asahi give other bases for the decision besides the 
minimum contacts argument. These other bases, how~ver, derive their greatest support from 
Justices Brennan and Marshall, both of whom have since retired. See generally Howard B. Stravitz, 
Sayonara to Minimum Contracts: Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 39 S.C. L. Rev. 729 (1988) 
(giving an in-depth analysis of Asahi and cases preceding it). 
102. 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 343 (3d Cir. 1990). Portions of the discussion of this 
case were prepared by Gregory Gelfand. 
103. The Step-Saver opinion identifies this case as Green Zinner, P.C. v. Step-Saver Data 
Systems, Inc., filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Id. at 
345. This ruling apparently was not appealed, and by operation of collateral estoppel it resolves the 
question for all of the other New York cases then pending. 
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Step-Saver then filed an action in Pennsylvania seeking a declaratory judg-
ment of indemnity through vouching in. This procedural context did not require 
a reconsideration of the New York ruling on personal jurisdiction. Personal 
jurisdiction over the suppliers in Pennsylvania (for the declaratory judgment 
action) was clear because they sold directly to Step-Saver in Pennsylvania. The 
Third Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding that the declaratory judgment 
was unripe because it would not conclusively resolve any questions. 104 Until the 
twelve underlying cases were resolved, it would not be known if Step-Saver was 
liable at all, nor if that liability grew out of aspects of the transactions for which 
the suppliers might be liable. 105 This conclusion is based on a plain confusion of 
substance with procedure. 
The Third Circuit seems to believe that vendors are given power under the 
Code to bind their suppliers without ever going to court: 
In this case, Step-Saver will take the same steps whether [declaratory relief 
is given] or not. ... Step-Saver has already vouched in the defendants 
under U.C.C. § 2-607(5 )(a). Because defendants chose not to defend the 
customer suits on their own, they will be held liable as long as the defect 
proven in the customer suits is attributable to them. See generally, A. 
Squillante & ]. Fonesca, 3 Williston on Sales 291-92 (4th ed. 1974) 
("The seller-warrantor cannot object to liability on the ground that no 
jurisdiction attached to him over the litigation involved because the vouch-
ing in letter merely asserts that he has liability over to the warrantee. 
Jurisdiction is not a prerequisite for the effective application of the vouch-
ing in letter."); Restatement (Second) of Judgments section 57 comment C, 
illustration 4 (1982) ("[A) refusal to submit to jurisdiction ... may be a 
proper basis for estopping the indemnitor from contesting determinations 
in the principal action."). Thus the declaration will not be of significant 
"practical help in ending the controversy" (citation omitted) because the 
declaration would merely do what established products liability law and 
U.C.C. section 2-607(5) already do, i.e. make the manufacturer ultimately 
liable for defective products. 106 
The assertion that, through vouching in,107 a judgment of a New York court 
can bind the suppliers even though they have a due process right not to have 
their rights adjudicated in New York seems dubious at best. However, on the 
104. Step-Saver, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 352. 
105. In the Pennsylvania action, Step-Saver also sought to recover consequential damages for the 
costs incurred in attempting to maintain customer goodwill. Curiously, the Third Circuit held that 
this portion of the suit could go forward despite the court's professed refusal to decide whether the 
suppliers' goods are the cause of the customers' complaints. Id. at 375. 
106. Id. (citation omitted). This statement, arguably a ruling on the merits of Step-Saver's claim 
(declaring the suppliers to be vouched in) is simply a secondary reason for the court's ultimate 
holding, and therefore is not binding on the parties. It will have to be relitigated after the underlying 
cases are resolved. 
107. The vouching in is not a contractual term, but rather is a provision of state law most like a 
long arm statute. There is no doubt that the parties could contractually waive jurisdictional 
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basis of the authorities cited by the Third Circuit, it may be argued that 
vouching in is not an assertion of jurisdiction. The question is an open one and 
its answer is at least as uncertain now as it ever was. 
Finally, one case demonstrates what is probably a sensible relaxation of the 
notification requirement of section 2-607(3)(a). In Cooley v. Big Horn Harves-
tore Systems, lnc., 108 the Colorado Supreme Court held that a buyer (consumer 
or commercial) is only required to give notice to its immediate seller. 109 
REJECTION AND REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE 
Comment 1 to section 2-608 on revocation of acceptance provides: "The 
section no longer speaks of 'rescission,' a term capable of ambiguous application 
either to transfer of title to the goods or to the contract of sale and susceptible 
also of confusion with cancellation for cause of an executed or executory portion 
of the contract." Does this mean that the common law remedy of rescission can 
safely be ignored? The practical lesson from H.B. Fuller Co. v. Kinetic Systems, 
lnc.,110 is that a buyer who does so runs the risk of losing its only remedy. 
Fuller involved the purchase of a "palletizer", which is a large piece of 
machinery that stacks cartons or bags on pallets. Unfortunately, the palletizer 
never performed up to expectations because the buyer did not know that it also 
needed to purchase a "bag flattener" to precondition the filled bags. In its 
complaint the buyer sought rescission of the contract. At trial, however, both 
parties proceeded on the assumption that the buyer was seeking to revoke its 
acceptance under section 2-608. This proved to be the buyer's undoing. The 
district court granted a directed verdict to the seller on the ground that the 
palletizer conformed to the contract. 111 The Seventh Circuit affirmed. After 
noting that a distinction continues to exist under the Code between revocation 
and rescission, 112 the court went on to point out that the buyer might have been 
objections without invoking due process concerns, but the assertion of vouching is exclusively an 
assertion of state authority. 
108. 813 P.2d 736, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 977 (Colo. 1991). 
109. The court reasoned that the term "seller" as used in § 2-607(3)(a) was intended to refer 
only to the seller with whom buyer was in privity. Cooley, 813 P.2d at 741, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) at 982. 
110. 932 F.2d 681, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1080 (7th Cir. 1991 ). 
111. Revocation of acceptance under § 2-608 is predicated on a showing that the goods failed to 
conform to the contract. See U.C.C. § 2-608(1 ). The fact that the palletizer did not perform to the 
buyer's satisfaction did not mean that it did not perform in accordance with the terms of the parties' 
agreement. Where, as here, the seller effectively disclaimed the implied warranties of 
merchantability and fitness, there was no breach of contract. 
112. U.C.C. § 2-711 (I) permits cancellation of the contract following rejection or revocation. 
The court was of the opinion that while this package of remedies (rejection or revocation and 
cancellation) supplants the contract action for rescission it leaves unaffected the common law action 
where there has been fraud or misrepresentation. Fuller, 932 F.2d at 685-86, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
2d (Callaghan) at 1085-86. The court was apparently correct. See U.C.C § 2-721 which states: 
[r]emedies for material misrepresentation or fraud include all remedies available under this 
Article for non-fraudulent breach. Neither rescission, or a claim for rescission of the contract 
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successful had it paid attention to the wording of its complaint and insisted that 
its claim was for rescission on the basis of the seller's fraud. 113 Then, the 
conformity of the palletizer would not have been decisive. This "legal nuance," 
as the court called it, is one that should not be overlooked in future cases. 114 
lrz re Stem 115 considered the perennial question of whether the buyer's right 
of revocation is defeated by the continued use of the goods.116 The case involved 
a used car, which was driven for seven months and nearly 9,000 miles after the 
buyer's attempted revocation of acceptance and before suit. The court, citing 
Stroh v. Americarz Recreatiorz & Mobile Home Corp., 117 held that the use of the 
car after revocation was wrongful;118 consequently, the buyer was liable for the 
value of that use. 119 The prior revocation, however, remained effective. 120 
Although the court emphasized the practical considerations facing buyers of 
automobiles, 121 it failed to indicate the degree to which those considerations 
were determinative of the outcome. Therefore, we are left to wonder whether a 
different good (less important) or a different type of buyer (merchant) will 
produce a different result. 
Although the right to cure under section 2-508 is limited to rejections, some 
courts have been persuaded to extend that right to revocations under section 
for sale nor rejection or return of the goods shall bar or be deemed inconsistent with a claim for 
damages or other remedy. 
113. Fuller, 932 F.2d at 686 n.2, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1086 n.2. The court 
saw as possibly fraudulent the seller's pre-delivery reassurances that the palletizer could be made to 
work properly and its failure to ever mention the need for a flattener. However, Fuller never made 
this argument. 
114. Id. at 686, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1086. 
115. 571 So. 2d 1112, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1070 (Ala. 1990). 
116. See David Frisch & John D. Wladis, General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and 
Documents of Title, 46 Bus. Law. 1455, 1488 (1991) (discussing Triad Sys. Corp. v. Alsip. 880 
F.2d 247, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 567 (10th Cir. 1989) and Steers Sec., Inc. v. 
Sportscoach Corp. of Am., 781 P.2d 1267, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 788 (Or. Ct. App. 
1989)). 
117. 530 P.2d 989, 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 726 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975). 
118. In re Stem, 571 So. 2d at 1115-16, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1074-76. 
U.C.C. § 2-602(2) provides that "after rejection any exercise of ownership by the buyer with respect 
to any commercial unit is wrongful as against the seller." 
119. Not all courts agree that the seller is entitled to compensation for the buyer's use of the 
goods prior to their return. See, e.g., Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. House, 520 A.2d 162, 169, 3 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 122, 131-32 (Conn. 1987) (concluding that equities weighed in 
favor of denying setoff). 
120. Buyers should be cautioned, however, that post-revocation use of the good may be evidence 
that the nonconformity did not substantially impair its value. 
121. There is reason to suppose that the court was particularly sympathetic to the plight of this 
buyer, who we are told, needed the car for the transportation of his child. In re Stem, 571 So. 2d at 
1116. 
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2-608.122 Thus in Tucker v. Agua Yacht Harbor Corp.,123 the district court 
granted summary judgment to the seller because it was not given a reasonable 
opportunity to effect cure.124 An interesting issue which the court did not discuss 
was whether this judicially created right of cure should be bounded by the same 
statutory limitations that are found in section 2-508. 125 
IMPRACTICABILITY 
In PPG Industries, Inc. v. Shell Oil,126 the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, 
considered the extent to which a seller can expand the protection given it by 
U.C.C. Section 2-615. In that case the parties signed a long-term contract for 
the production and sale of ethylene. The contract contained a clause excusing 
either seller or buyer if .its performance were "delayed or prevented by any 
circumstances (except financial) reasonably beyond its control or by fire, explo-
sion."127 Five years later, after an explosion at the seller's refinery reduced its 
output of ethylene, seller reduced the quantities being delivered under the 
contract. The buyer sued the seller for breach, and the district court granted 
seller's motion for summary judgment, holding that the excuse clause covered all 
explosions, not just those beyond the seller's reasonable control. The Fifth 
Circuit affirmed, holding that section 2-615 did not invalidate the excuse 
clause. 128 The court declined to hold that section 2-615 required the excusing 
event to be either unforeseeable or beyond the seller's reasonable control. 
Instead, it applied the test of Comment 8, "mercantile sense and reason,'' and 
found that test satisfied where, as here, two sophisticated corporations had 
agreed to the clause. It also held that the clause was not manifestly unreasonable 
under U.C.C. Section 1-102(3). 
The court's conclusion that section 2-615 does not require the excusing event 
to be beyond the seller's reasonable control is debatable. A prior draft of the 
section explicitly included that requirement.129 Despite the section's deletion, 
122. See generally Thomas K. Brown, Revocation of Acceptance: The Right to Cure After 
Gappelberg v. Landrum, 38 Baylor L. Rev. 441, 453-55 (1986) (discussing the limited application 
of the right to cure revocations made under § 2-608 ). 
123. 749 F. Supp. 142, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 382 (N.D. Miss. 1990) (applying 
Mississippi law). 
124. The controlling Mississippi decision is Fitzner Pontiac-Buick-Cadillac, Inc. v. Smith, 523 
So. 2d 324, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 396 (Miss. 1988). 
125. U.C.C. § 2-508 limits cure to situations where "the time for performance has not yet 
expired", U.C.C. § 2-508(1), or "the seller had reasonable grounds to believe [the tender] would be 
acceptable with or without money allowance." U.C.C. § 2-508(2). 
126. 919 F.2d 17, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 390 (5th Cir. 1990). 
127. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 727 F. Supp. 285, 287 (E.D.La. 1989), ajf'd, 919 F.2d 
17 (5th Cir. 1990). 
128. PPG Industries, 919 F.2d at 18, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 390. 
129. See John D. Wladis, Impracticability As Risk Allocation: The Effect of Changed Circum-
stances Upon Contract Obligations for the Sale of Goods, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 503, 563 ( 1988). 
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the requirement apparently survived, 130 probably as part of the seller's general 
obligation of good faith performance. 131 The court may have declined to hold 
that section 2-615 includes the reasonable control requirement in order to avoid 
language in the section that seems to restrict the ability of the seller to contract 
for more protection than the section gives it. 132 The reason for this language 
remains largely obscure. 133 Consequently, the P.E.B. Article 2 Study Group has 
recommended that the language be amended to remove any restriction on the 
seller's right to contract for increased protection. 134 
BUYER'S MONEY REMEDIES AND THEIR 
LIMITATIONS 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently had an opportunity to further 
clarify the buyer's lost-profits remedy under sections 2-714 and 2-715. In AM/ 
PM Franchise Association v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,135 franchisees that operated 
AM/PM Mini Markets in Pennsylvania and New Jersey brought a breach of 
warranty suit. The complaint alleged that from early 1982 through September 
30, 1985, Atlantic Richfield Co. (ARCO) sold its franchisees a type of experi-
mental unleaded gasoline (blended with oxinol) which resulted in poor engine 
performance and physical damage to fuel system components. The franchisees 
claimed that this breach of warranty by ARCO caused them to lose business and 
profits. 
The Pennsylvania high court held that the franchisees were entitled to try to 
prove their damages. 136 In the course of its opinion, the court presented an 
original tripartite categorization of the types of lost profits recoverable as 
consequential damages. The first type was primary profits consisting of the lost 
gasoline sales during the period that ARCO delivered the nonconforming 
gasoline. Next was lost secondary profits attributable to the decrease in sales of 
other items sold at the mini-marts. Finally, there were goodwill damages or 
prospective damages, as they are sometimes called. Although not actually 
130. Id.; see also Comment on Criticisms of Article 2 Uniform Commercial Code 110 (Oct. 31, 
1955) in the Braucher Papers, supra note 27, File 26-2 (N.Y. Law Revision Commission recom-
mendation to limit excuse for impracticability by adding words "without his fault" is rejected for the 
reason that "[!]imitation to impracticability arising 'without the seller's fault' is implicit in the Code 
text."). 
131. Cf U.C.C. § 2-615, cmt. 5 and Cross Reference: Point 5: Section 1-203; id. § 1-203 and 
cmt. I (describing§ 2-615 as particular application of general obligation of good faith). Good faith 
under Article 2 for a merchant seller, includes "observance of reasonable commercial standards of 
fair dealing in the trade." Id. § 2-103(1)(b). 
132. U.C.C. § 2-615 begins: "(e]xcept so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation." 
133. See A.B.A. Task Force, "An Appraisal of the March 1, 1990, Preliminary Report of the 
U.C.C. Article 2 Study Group," 16 Del. J. Corp. L. 981, 1200-01 (1991) [hereinafter A.B.A. Task 
Force Appraisal]. 
134. Preliminary Report, Article 2 Study Group: March 1, 1990, Rec. A 2.6(10)(B), reprinted 
in A.B.A. Task Force Appraisal, supra note 133, at 1196. 
135. 584 A.2d 915, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 11 (Pa. 1990). 
136. Atlantic Richfield Co., 584 A.2d at 918, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 12. 
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claimed by the franchisees, these would refer to the losses which continued to 
accrue even after the problem with the gasoline had been solved. In a sharp 
break from precedent,137 the court concluded that all three types of lost profits 
could be recovered upon proper proof.138 
AM/PM is an important decision. There is no reason, other than the 
elevation of form over substance, why any particular type of loss should be 
considered too speculative as a matter of law to allow recovery. The court noted 
that modern advances in market analysis and economics have made it possible to 
prove with sufficient certainty losses which were formerly incapable of proof. In 
sum, AM/PM represents a significant step towards a general rule of damages 
which would merely distinguish between general damages and all other dam-
ages. 
While section 2-715 specifically provides for an award of damages for injury 
to the person, 139 it leaves open the question of whether damages for mental 
anguish are recoverable in a breach of warranty action. 140 This issue arose in 
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Dillard,141 which involved the purchase of a new 
automobile. The undisputed evidence showed that the plaintiff had acquired an 
automobile that was neither reliable nor safe. In fact, it was such a "lemon" that 
he turned it in for repair twenty-one times during the first year and a half. The 
Alabama Supreme Court affirmed a jury award of $8,000 for mental anguish. It 
concluded that the words "injury to the person" in Alabama's nonuniform 
version of section 2-714(2) evinced the legislative intent to include these dam-
ages, without regard to whether they are accompanied by physical injury.142 
Other cases deserving note are Fortin v. Ox-Bow Marina /nc.,143 in which the 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that a buyer who properly revoked 
acceptance was entitled to recover as consequential and incidental damages, 
respectively, interest on a purchase-money loan and the sales tax; Cooley v. Big 
Horn Harvestore Systems, /nc.,144 in which the Colorado Supreme Court 
determined that the failure of a limited remedy of repair or replacement to 
137. Historically, damages for loss of goodwill in breach of warranty cases were not permitted in 
Pennsylvania. See Kassab v. Central Soya, 246 A.2d 848, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 925 (Pa. 
1968). 
138. Atlantic Richfield Co., 584 A.2d at 926, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 25. The 
recoverability of each item of damages would depend upon a showing that the damages were 
reasonably foreseeable at the time the agreement was entered into, see U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a), and 
the defendant's breach was the proximate cause of the harm suffered. 
139. Section 2-715 reads in pertinent part: "Consequential damages resulting from the seller's 
breach include: ... [i]njury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of 
warranty." U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b). 
140. Compare Bogner v. General Motors Corp., 459 N.Y.S.2d 679, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 466 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982) (damages for emotional distress were allowed), with Wise v. 
General Motors Corp., 588 F. Supp. 1207 (W.D. Va. 1984) (damages for emotional distress were 
disallowed). 
141. 579 So. 2d 1301, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 475 (Ala. 1991). 
142. Dillard, 579 So. 2d at 1306-07, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 482-84. 
143. 557 N.E.2d 1157, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 691(Mass.1990). 
144. 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 977 (Colo. 1991). 
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achieve its essential purpose negated a contractual limitation on the availability 
of consequential damages; and American Nursery Products, Inc. v. Indian Wells 
Orchards,145 in which the Washington Supreme Court held that where there is 
no indicia of unfair surprise, the conscionability of a clause excluding conse-
quential damages in a contract between merchants should be judged by a less 
stringent standard than that which is applied in the consumer sales context. 
SELLER'S MONEY REMEDIES 
U.C.C. Section 2-718(1) provides, in part, "A term fixing unreasonably large 
liquidated damages is void as a penalty." Kyassay v. Murray 146 raised the 
problem of reasonableness in the context of a newly established business. In this 
case, the contract was for the purchase and sale of 24,000 cases of baklava at 
$19.00 per case. A liquidated damages clause set the seller's damages at $5.00 
(the expected profit) for each case not accepted by the buyer. 
The court properly concluded that this was an appropriate case for the 
recovery of lost profits pursuant to U.C.C. Section 2-708(2), notwithstanding 
that the seller had only recently gone into the bakery business.147 The only 
disadvantage a new seller faces is the practical one of not being able to rely on a 
history of earnings to prove future losses with reasonable certainty. 148 
On the issue of whether the contract measure of $5.00 expected profit per 
case was reasonable, the opinion is troubling. Having properly rejected the 
relevancy of the seller's past earnings as an insurance adjuster, the court held 
that the proper measure by which to judge the clause's reasonableness was the 
seller's actual loss. The difficulty with such an approach is that it negates many 
of the efficiencies that a liquidated damages provision was designed to promote. 
It would make more sense to invoke a far less restrictive view of reasonableness 
and allow for the enforcement of these clauses if bargained-for and not other-
wise unconscionable. 149 
145. 797 P.2d 477, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 928 (Wash. 1990). 
146. 808 P.2d 896, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1093 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991). 
147. Kvassey, P.2d at 903, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1100-01. U.C.C. § 2-708(2), 
which allows recovery for loss of profits, is particularly well suited to those cases where the seller 
does not have the goods on hand. The assumptions underlying subsection ( 1) are that a market for 
the goods exists and the seller will be able to recover all, or at least a part, of its anticipated profit 
from a substituted sale. Where the seller has no goods to sell, the buyer is the seller's only source of 
recovery. 
In deciding that a new business may recover future profits, the court relied, in part, on official 
comment 2 to U.C.C. § 2-708, which states: "It is not necessary to a recovery of 'profit' to show a 
history of earnings, especially if a new venture is involved." For a case in which this same comment 
was used to justify an award of profits to a newly formed buyer, see Jn re Merritt Logan, Inc., 901 
F.2d 349, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 421 (3d Cir. 1990). 
148. The court was careful to stress that to require a more exacting standard of proof from new 
businesses would be to place them at a substantial disadvantage. 808 P.2d at 903, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1100-01. 
149. Whether such an approach would be in accord with the statute as it is presently written is 
debatable. U.C.C. § 2-718(1) provides: "Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in 
the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual 
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One area in which the U.C.C. offers little guidance is in allocating the 
burdens of proof in particular situations. 15° For example, suppose that following 
the buyer's repudiation, the seller decides not to obtain the goods called for by 
the contract. This is permissible under section 2-704(2), provided that the 
decision to cease performance is reasonable. In Young v. Frank's Nursery & 
Crafts, Inc., 151 the Ohio Supreme Court held that the buyer had the burden of 
proving that the seller's decision not to cut evergreen boughs following the 
buyer's repudiation was unreasonable. At stake here was the seller's right to 
recover his lost profit under section 2-708(2). A finding that his conduct was 
unreasonable would relegate him to the less generous contract-market formula 
of section 2-708(1).152 
No provision for consequential damages is included in the seller's remedies 
under Article 2. Thus, the characterization of seller's damages as incidental or 
consequential may be critical. Often, however, the line between these two forms 
of damages cannot be easily drawn. In Jelen & Son, Inc. v. Bandimere,153 the 
seller contracted to sell barrels of hazardous chemicals. Although it was unclear 
which party was initially responsible for transporting the barrels to the buyer's 
premises, the seller eventually agreed to make delivery. On the way to the 
buyer's place of business he got lost and turned his trucks around in the parking 
lot of the local fire department. As fate would have it, the fire marshal happened 
to be looking out of his window at the time and noticed the trucks with liquid 
splashing out of the barrels. The seller was charged with criminal violations for 
transporting hazardous materials. The charges were dropped after he agreed to 
pay all costs associated with the clean-up costs plus the legal fees he incurred in 
defending the criminal action. 
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the seller's damages were 
consequential and hence, not recoverable. 154 It is possible that the court was 
harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of 
otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy." 
150. See generally Ronald ]. Allen & Robert A. Hillman, Evidentiary Problems ln--and 
Solutions For-The Uniform Commercial Code, 1984 Duke L.J. 92. 
151. 569 N.E.2d 1034, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 463 (Ohio 1991). 
152. If the decision not to cut were determined to be unreasonable, the effect would be to treat 
the seller the same as if he had cut. As a seller who hypothetically has the goods, the marketplace 
would be available to him as a source of recoupment. Therefore, the buyer's liability would be 
limited to the difference between the contract price and the market price under U.C.C. § 2-718(1 ). 
See infra note 162. 
153. 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 344 (Colo. 1990). 
154. Bandimere, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 352-53. The court's disposition of the 
damages issue excused it from having to decide whether the buyer had actually breached the 
contract. Two reasons are offered to explain why the buyer's rejection may not have been wrongful. 
Easy to understand is the view that there was no duty to accept because the seller's tender was 
unreasonable (the materials were loaded in open, corroded and leaking barrels). More difficult to 
comprehend is the court's suggestion that if the seller was not contractually obligated to make 
delivery, then there were no remaining duties under the contract which could be breached by either 
party. That is, the contract had been fully performed and the seller was holding the materials as the 
buyer's agent. But if that were true, would not the buyer be under a non-Code duty to indemnify the 
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wrong. Were not these damages causally connected to the buyer's rejection and 
incurred in relation to the goods? 155 Is it not contrary to the remedial policy 
expressed in section 1-106 to deny the seller, in all cases, the recovery of 
consequentials? 156 Perhaps the time has come to discard artificial labels in favor 
of a rule which would allow either party to recover "uncommon" damages 
subject only to the "reason to know" requirement found in section 2-715(2)(a). 
STATUTES OF LIMITATION 
As in prior years, most of the statute of limitations cases involved attempts to 
escape the basic rule of section 2-725 that a cause of action accrues and the 
limitations period begins to run "when tender of delivery is made."157 In 
Luddeke v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc.,158 the buyers brought suit against the 
seller and the manufacturer of a home heating, air conditioning, and hot water 
system approximately five years after the system was installed. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia was not persuaded by the buyers' 
contention that the manufacturer's limited warranty providing "a free replace-
ment part ... for any part found defective"159 tolled the statute during the 
period that repairs were attempted. Although the court was willing to assume 
without deciding that this warranty was a "future performance" warranty 
under section 2-725(2),160 it nevertheless concluded that the buyers' claim was 
time-barred because the relief requested in the complaint did not seem to be 
predicated on a breach of this particular warranty or promise. 161 
seller for all liabilities incurred, notwithstanding their nature? See Warren A. Seavey, Agency, 
§ 168 (1964). 
155. See U.C.C. § 2-710 ("Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller include any commercially 
reasonable charges, expenses or commissions incurred in stopping delivery, in the transportation, 
care and custody of goods after the buyer's breach, in connection with return or resale of the goods 
or otherwise resulting from the breach."). 
156. U.C.C. § 1-106 provides: "The remedies provided by this title shall be liberally adminis-
tered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had 
fully performed, but neither consequential or special nor penal damages may be had except as 
specifically provided in this title or by any other rule of law." (emphasis added) Ironically, the court 
relied on the italicized language of U.C.C. § 1-106 to support its conclusion that a seller may not 
recover consequentials. 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 351. 
157. u.c.c. § 2-725(2) (1991). 
158. 387 S.E.2d 502, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 123 (Va. 1990). 
159. Luddeke, 387 S.E.2d at 504, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 125. This so-called 
"limited warranty" also included a disclaimer of responsibility for any incidental or consequential 
damages. 
160. The statute of limitations begins to run for most breach of warranty claims when tender of 
delivery is made; however, if the warranty "explicitly extends to future performance of the goods 
and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance," the statute of limitations 
begins to run only "when the breach is or should have been discovered." U.C.C. § 2-725(2) ( 1991 ). 
To be precise, the court's assumption was that the warranty was implicitly a warranty of future 
performance. 387 S.E.2d at 504, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 125. But if it is implicit, 
the warranty does not explicitly extend to the future performance of the good, does it? 
161. The quoted portion of the complaint alleged that "the Defendants failed and refused ... to 
replace said system with one that works", id. at 504, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 126, 
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In all respects the court's opinion is troubling. First, the court should not have 
so readily assumed that a promise to replace is a warranty. 162 We argued in a 
previous survey that if a promise of this sort is any one thing, it is a limited 
remedy, not a warranty. 163 Second, if the system did not perform properly after 
the defective parts were replaced, it could be argued that the remedy had failed 
its essential purpose; therefore, the buyers had available to them the full 
panoply of Code remedies, including revocation of acceptance. 164 Finally, one 
should question the wisdom of deciding cases based on a strict construction of 
the pleadings. We can only guess whether the case might have been decided 
differently had the court focused more on the substance of the buyers' claim 
than on the form in which it was presented. 
As an alternative to a future performance warranty, buyers often seek to 
extend the limitations period by arguing that section 2-725 is inapplicable to 
their claim. A recurring issue which arose again this year is whether this section 
governs an action for indemnity. In Sheehan v. Morris Irrigation, lnc., 165 the 
answer was yes, only because the court believed that no inequity would result 
from its application. Here, the plaintiff discovered the breach of warranty and 
could have brought suit within four years of the sale. 166 Unfortunately, this 
case-by-case approach is likely to spawn more litigation than it resolves. 
Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville Investment, lnc., 167 added to the 
confusion. In this case, the Utah Supreme Court took the position that section 2-
725 applies only to indemnification claims that grow out of U.C.C. contract and 
and the remedies demanded were replacement of the entire system and consequential damages. Id., 
12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 126. Moreover, the buyers maintained that the "repair and 
replacement promises are not warranties" (emphasis in original) and that the cause of action for 
breach of these promises occurred when the attempted repairs failed. The court shot down this 
argument on the grounds that no promise to repair was ever made and the complaint did not allege a 
breach of the promise to replace. Id., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 126. 
162. The majority view is clearly otherwise. See, e.g., Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Sys., 569 F. 
Supp. 1261, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1222 (D. Del. 1983); Tittle v. Steel City Oldsmobile 
GMC Truck, Inc., 544 So.2d 883, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 701 (Ala. 1989); Voth v. 
Chrysler Motor Corp., 545 P.2d 371, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 954 (Kan. 1976). But see 
Standard Alliance Indus., Inc. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 65 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979) (repair or replace warranty for 
specific period of time explicitly warrants future performance). 
163. See David Frisch & John D. Wladis, General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and 
Documents of Title, 45 Bus. Law. 2289, 2325 (1990). This is not meant to suggest that the promise 
cannot also constitute a warranty. It may be that it is an indirect way of saying that the goods will 
continue to perform in the future, i.e., a warranty of future performance. Id. 
164. See U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1991). That would mean that the unartfully worded demand for 
revocation was not at odds with the idea that the underlying breach was of the duty to replace. 
165. 460 N.W.2d 413, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 145 (N.D. 1990). 
166. The court reasoned that the right of indemnification is rooted in equity and should be 
available only when the party seeking it is free of wrongdoing. Id. at 417, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) at 150. The transgression in this case was the failure to proceed diligently and 
promptly once the claim was discovered. Judge Sabers argued in dissent that the only relevant fault 
is fault in causing the product not to perform as warranted. Id. at 419, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) at 415. 
167. 794 P.2d 11, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 415 (Utah 1990). 
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U.C.C. warranty actions (except a warranty action under section 2-318). 168 
Therefore, it did not govern where the underlying action was brought by a party· 
who was never a purchaser of the goods and who sought to recover for injury to 
personal property. 169 
Once again, a disappointed buyer of counterfeit artwork was confronted with 
a statute of limitations defense; this year, however, the outcome was different. 170 
In Balog v. Center Art Gallery-Hawaii, Inc., 171 the buyers were given a 
certificate of authenticity with each purchase and received at various times 
thereafter a "Confidential Appraisal-Certificate of Authenticity."172 The district 
court, in an exceptionally well-articulated and detailed opinion, concluded that: 
(i) the certificate of authenticity created an explicit warranty of future perfor-
mance under section 2-725(2);173 (ii) each time a certificate of authenticity was 
mailed to the buyers, a new warranty was given and a new claim for breach 
accrued;174 and (iii) the repeated mailings to the buyers of certificates of 
authenticity constituted fraudulent concealment of their claims and tolled the 
statute of limitations. 175 
168. Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc., 794 P.2d at 18, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 426-27. 
The type of damages sought will determine the true nature of the action. Accordingly, U.C.C. 
§ 2-725 will govern in actions for economic or breach of contract damages, and in those actions 
where personal property damages are claimed as consequentials for breach of contract. 
169. The indemnification claim was against the manufacturer of a wood beam and resulted from 
the plaintiff's payment to the lessee of a building whose roof collapsed because the beam was 
defective. 
170. For discussions of past cases, see David Frisch & John D. Wladis, General Provisions, 
Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 43 Bus. Law. 1259, 1302 (1988) (discussing 
Firestone & Parson, Inc. v. Union League, 672 F. Supp. 819, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 
449 (E.D. Pa. 1987)); David Frisch & John D. Wladis, General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, 
and Documents of Title, 44 Bus. Law. 1445, 1491-92 (1989) (discussing Wilson v. Hammer 
Holdings, Inc.,, 850 F.2d 3, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 321 (1st Cir. 1988)); David Frisch 
& John D. Wladis, General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 46 Bus. 
Law. 1455, 1500-01 (1991) (discussing Rosen v. Spanierman, 894 F.2d 28, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
2d (Callaghan) 846 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
171. 745 F. Supp. 1556, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 962 (D. Haw. 1990). 
172. Each certificate maintained that the pieces were Dali originals or limited editions, and 
represented that they had appreciated in value since they were first purchased. Id. at 1558, 12 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 964-65. 
173. However, this conclusion does not seem consistent with the substance of the express 
warranty which the court described in the following terms: "[F]airness dictates that representations 
offered by one party with the expectation that they be relied upon by another have some reasonable 
basis in fact. Such is the requirement of§ 2-313." Id. at 1566, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 
at 976. It would seem that this warranty is breached, if at all, at the time the representations were 
made; if there exists an element of futurity it is not readily apparent. 
17 4. But if the buyers had already purchased the items, how were the later representations able 
to become "part of the basis of the bargain"? See U.C.C. § 2-313(t)(a) (1991). 
17 5. The law of tolling, including the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, is explicitly saved by 
U.C.C. § 2-725(4) ("[T]his section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limita-
tions .... "). 
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Sellers occasionally have problems with section 2-725. A representative case 
is Schelske v. South Dakota Poultry Cooperative, Inc., 176 in which the South 
Dakota Supreme Court held that a cause of action for nonpayment accrues 
when payment first becomes due under the contract. This may or may not be 
when the goods are first tendered to the buyer. 
176. 465 N.W.2d 187, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 782 (S.D. 1991). 

